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Abstract  
This paper will draw on Richard Dawkin's idea of the 
'meme' to discuss how the creative arts exegesis can 
operate as valorisation and validation of creative arts 
research. According to Dawkins, the rate and 
fecundity of replication permits an artefact to achieve 
recognition and stability as a meme within a culture. 
The value and application of traditional forms of 
research is underpinned by a secondary order of 
production, publication, that establishes visibility of 
the work and articulates its empirical processes and 
findings as sources of social benefit and cultural 
enhancement. 
In the arts, conventional modes of valorisation such 
as the gallery system, reviews and criticism focus on 
the artistic product and hence, lack sustained 
engagement with the creative processes as models of 
research. Such engagement is necessary to articulate 
and validate studio practices as modes of enquiry. 
A crucial question to initiate this engagement is: 
'What did the studio process reveal that could not 
have been revealed by any other mode of enquiry?'  
Re-versioning of the studio process and its significant 
moments through the exegesis locates the work 
within the broader field of practice and theory. It is 
also part of the replication process that establishes the 
creative arts as a stable research discipline, able to 
withstand peer and wider assessment. The exegesis is 
a primary means of realising creative arts research as 
'meme'.  
  
  
I would like to suggest that the notion of the 'meme' is a useful one 
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for addressing a number of key questions relating to creative arts 
research generally, and to the exegesis in particular. These 
questions are as follows: 
* What is it?  
* Why do we need it?  
* What can it do within the context of a knowledge economy? 
* How do we judge its success and value? 
What is to follow is prefaced by an acknowledgment that the field 
of creative arts is a heterogeneous one, and that not all those who 
would call themselves artists, may choose to practice or seek 
recognition within a research framework. However, those who do 
seek endorsement of their practices by pursuing a higher degree 
and other forms of practice-based research within the university, 
are working in a relatively new discipline of research and will thus 
inevitably be subject to evaluation according to criteria that relate 
to research and the knowledge economy in general. 
Let us start with a brief definition of 'meme' which will be 
extended as this paper proceeds. In his description of memes, 
Richard Dawkins (1981) observes that survival of such entities is 
dependent on the capacity for self-replication, fitness or the 
likelihood of being replicated and fecundity or speed of replication 
to produce critical mass and ensure stability. An evolutionary 
advancement on their biological counterparts, memes can be 
described as cultural replicators. Drawing on Dawkin's earlier 
work, Richard Brodie (1996) describes memes as the basic 
building blocks of culture; ideas that form themselves into distinct 
memorable units and which are spread by something as simple as 
communicating. It should be noted that the cultural artefact - the 
tune, painting, poem, for example - is not the meme itself, but is a 
vehicle by which the meme, an idea or internal representation is 
externalised. Within this context, the exegesis may be viewed both 
as a replication or re-versioning of the completed artistic work as 
well as a reflective discourse on significant moments in the process 
of unfolding and revealing. As 'meme', it can operate both as a 
noun - an artefact in its own right, and a verb - a re-enactment of 
the artefact as process. As such it has the potential to reflect and 
map the logic from which a particular model of representation has 
emerged. Through this double articulation, the exegesis becomes a 
vehicle for validating the process of studio enquiry and elaborating 
the value of its outcomes. 
The evolution, stability and successful application of ideas and 
knowledge derived from research depends on how well such 
knowledge is replicated and understood by others. However, the 
replication mechanisms that have traditionally valorised and 
validated creative arts practices have focussed on product rather 
than process. Moreover, such mechanisms have tended to rely on 
the mystification of artistic products as commodities rather than an 
elucidation of creative arts practices as alternative modes of 
understanding the world and of revealing new knowledge.  
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An understanding of the meme as a vehicle for fixing ideas in our 
collective consciousness allows us to recognise how conventional 
valorisation of the artefact as product proceeds at the expense of an 
appreciation of the value of creative processes as modes of 
revealing - in other words as modes of enquiry and research.  
An appraisal of conventional means of valorisation bears this out. 
Paradoxically the process that valorises art as commodity is at the 
same time a process of mystification rather than illumination. The 
more a work is reproduced in catalogues, books, magazines, on 
chocolate boxes and T-shirts, and sold and resold in by dealers, the 
greater is the aura of awe and mystique that surrounds it. This is 
particularly pertinent to the visual arts as demonstrated in Brian O' 
Doherty's description of the modernist gallery and its discourses as 
'white cube', one which I suggest, continues to have relevance. O' 
Doherty points out that the conventional gallery with its white 
walls, sealed windows, polished floors and light emanating from 
the ceiling can be likened to a church or tomb: 
The ideal gallery subtracts from the artwork all cues 
that interfere with the fact that it is "art". The work is 
isolated from everything that would detract from it 
own evaluation of itself. (O'Doherty, 1976: 14) 
The work in this context is given a sense of eternal sameness, a 
hermetically sealed repository of its maker's divine inspiration. The 
viewer of the work also relinquishes time and lived experience 
within the frame of sympathetic magic or mystique that is created. 
The idea of artist as genius, enhanced through modernist discourse 
has also added to the auratic nature of art that continues to 
dominate general perceptions. Indeed many artists themselves 
subscribe to the mystification process through their reluctance to 
discuss the origin and situated meanings of completed works. On 
the other hand artists are also often critical of institutional 
discourses on art that are removed from the experience of making 
and the individual consciousness of the maker: 
...A painting which has always a certain significance, 
at least as much as the man who did it. As soon as it 
is bought and hung on the wall takes on quite a 
different kind of significance and the painting is done 
for. (Chipp quotes Picasso, 1968:272) 
Picasso's comment relates to the tendency of institutional 
discourses to be dislocated from the studio process and its 
experiential, conceptual and intellectual framework. Michel Carter 
suggest a further disengagement of discourses from the process of 
inquiry results from the implication of such discourses in market 
forces through their focus on art works as precious objects. Whilst 
art historians and critical commentators may present a divergence 
of views on philosophical value of artistic output, Carter observes: 
'intellectual interest can quickly get transformed into economic 
interest. New meanings are equated to new [monetary] 
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values' (Carter, 1990: 115).  
Whatever their intellectual benefits, one could argue that 
conventional forms of criticism tend to focus on the finished 
product rather than material, intellectual and cognitive processes 
that produced it. The meme itself, or the internal representation of 
ideas that produced the artwork is then obscured by the vehicle in 
which it is carried. I should like to emphasise that this is not a 
denial of the intrinsic and generative value of the artworks and 
their capacity, in some instances, to stand alone as an object of 
knowledge. However, I do I believe there is a need for a shift in 
current perceptions of the role and status of the creative arts in the 
knowledge economy and that the exegesis is a crucial vehicle for 
effecting this shift.  
The exegesis as an illumination and replication of the meme or 
internal representation can adjust the critical focus and thus has the 
potential to valorise and validate the mode of inquiry as one worthy 
of recognition alongside research approaches belonging to more 
generously supported disciplines in the university and broader 
cultural arena. To put it another way, the exegesis is a means of 
articulating a more profound rationale for institutional recognition 
and support of creative arts research. 
In proposing this, I draw on Elliot W. Eisner's view that we need 
new ways of representing ideas and of illuminating the world and 
domains of knowledge. Eisner observes that a growing recognition 
of the limits of traditional ways of representing the world has given 
rise to a search for alternative approaches to transform and 
represent the contents of consciousness. Researchers are 
recognising that scientific inquiry is just one species of research 
and that 'research is not merely a species of social science' (Eisner, 
1997: 261). Dissatisfaction with positivism and behaviourism as 
reductive modes of knowing has also come from within the science 
disciplines themselves. In his essay, 'The Representation of Nature 
in Contemporary Physics' (1972), Werner Heisenberg states that 
the knowledge of science is applicable only to limited realms of 
experience and the scientific method is but a single method for 
understanding the world. Moreover, the notion of scientifically-
based knowledge as statements of ultimate truth contains an inner 
contradiction since 'the employment of this procedure changes and 
transforms its object' (Heisenberg, 1972:189). The work of 
Heisenberg and others reveals that knowledge is relational and that 
different models of inquiry will yield different forms of 
knowledge.  
Eisner supports the idea that creative arts-based inquiry has a role 
to play in extending new frontiers of research. He draws on the 
work of J. Schwab and others in proposing the centrality of 
practical and experiential knowledge (Eisner, 1997: 261). 
Understood through the Greek term phronesis, this form of inquiry 
requires deliberation and 'wise moral choice', or what I would call 
the attribution of value based on unfolding action and experience. 
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In this framework one can say that the exegesis illuminates 
particular knowledge and data derived from interacting with the 
environment (material and social) and then discusses it in relation 
to what is already presented in theory and general domains of 
knowledge. I would like to return to the meme analogy to suggest 
that the potential for innovation lies in this relational aspect of 
creative arts practice. 
Dawkins tells us that evolution occurs through the differential 
survival of replicating entities. The implication here, is that 
evolution occurs through change as an adaptation to the demands 
of the environment. Brodie comments further: 
Evolution requires two things: replication with a 
certain degree of fidelity, and innovation, and a 
certain degree of infidelity. (1996:68) 
The element of 'infidelity' is a crucial one since it implies a 
departure from customary ways of thinking and doing things. This 
helps us to understand why and how creative arts practices change 
over time. It also highlights an important function of the exegesis. 
In addition to answering the crucial question -'What did the studio 
process reveal that could not have been revealed by any other 
mode of enquiry? - the exegesis provides an opportunity for the 
creative arts researcher to elucidate why and how processes specific 
to the arts discipline concerned mutate to generate alternative 
models of understanding. At the same time, the researcher is also 
able to elaborate the significance of these models within a research 
context. Unlike those valorisation or replication processes that 
focus mainly on the economic and aesthetic value of creative 
works, the creative arts exegesis as meme, is a differential 
replication that emphasises processes of enquiry and their potential 
for innovative application beyond the production of the works 
themselves.  
The importance of this task for creative arts researchers is reflected 
in observations made by Lauchlan Chipman in his paper, 'What 
Governments Can't Know : The Knowledge Economy and the 
Market. Chipman points out that the information age to which we 
belong is one in which knowledge is rapidly replacing primary and 
industrial production as the basis for global economy. 'Knowledge 
is becoming the basic building block underlying wealth' (Chipman 
quotes Thurow , 2002:10). Chipman suggests that in a knowledge 
economy, it is necessary for a large number of people to 
comprehend the creative output of others in order for such outputs 
to be sufficiently taken up for the enhancement of society. Within 
the context of research , 'output' refers not only to the products of 
creative arts practices which may be judged by conventional 
criteria of artistic merit, but also to the experimental and material 
processes through which such products are externalised. 
Elsewhere, I have suggested some possible reasons for the slow 
recognition and acceptance of the value and validity of creative arts 
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research (Barrett 2002). One of these relates to dominance of 
instrumental and rationalistic modes of thinking within 
contemporary society. The social philosopher Pierre Bourdieu, 
contends that social and institutional systems that make up society 
or the habitus, operate according to two forms of logic: rational 
logic and an alternative logic, which may be understood as the 
logic of practice. Bourdieu explains that rationality achieves 
privileged status by a process of appropriating and subsuming, into 
its own logic, knowledge and cultural capital generated through 
practices that employ the alternative logic of practice. 
(Bourdieu,1990: 56). The exegesis can counteract this cultural 
'forgetting' by tracing and highlighting the logic of specific 
experiential inquiry. Another issue raised my earlier paper, is 
related to the lack of a critical mass of discourses that expounds the 
merits of creative arts research. For the exegesis to achieve success 
as replicator or meme, there will need to be continued efforts to 
promote and publish the outcomes of research in as many ways as 
possible.  
 
To conclude, I propose that an understanding of the creative arts 
exegesis as 'meme' is a useful way of illuminating what the 
exegesis is and what it has the potential to do. Its fitness for 
promoting the stability of a creative arts research discipline and 
advancing the successful evolution of creative arts research, may 
be judged both according to criteria of scholarly rigour, as well as 
its capacity to replicate and elucidate the value of studio enquiry 
processes and their applications within the in the general field of 
research.  
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